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JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to section 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the
Utah Code Annotated and Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).

ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in concluding that there was no genuine issue of

material fact as to Butterfield Ford's negligence in selling the fifteen-passenger van in
question and in not warning the plaintiffs employer of the van's propensity to roll over?
This issue was raised in the plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Butterfield
Ford's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (Record ("R.") 207-16), at the hearing
on Butterfield Ford's renewed motion for summary judgment (R. 335, at 32-34, 43-44),
and at the hearing on the form of the order (R. 335, at 46).
2.

Did the trial court err in concluding that a so-called passive retailer who

sells a defective product that injures a user cannot be liable in strict products liability
under the Utah Liability Reform Act?
This issue was raised in the plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Butterfield
Ford's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 77-83), at the hearing on that motion (R. 335,
at 15-19), in the plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Butterfield Ford's Renewed
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Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 216-21), and at the hearing on that motion (R. 335, at
34-38, 43-44).

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The propriety of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is a question of law,
which this court reviews for correctness. E.g., WebBankv. American Gen. Annuity Serv.
Corp., 2002 UT 88, ^ 10, 54 P.3d 1139. The court determines only whether the trial court
correctly held that there were no genuine issues of material fact and whether it correctly
applied the governing law. See id. It accords no deference to the trial court's conclusions
on these issues. Id.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR RULES
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is determinative of the first issue on appeal.
Sections 78-27-37(2) & -38(2) of the Utah Code Annotated are determinative of the
second issue on appeal. These provisions are set out in the addendum.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court
Below.
This is a products liability action. The plaintiff, Barry Sanns, was seriously injured

when the fifteen-passenger Ford Econoline E350 van he was riding in rolled over. He
brought this action against Ford Motor Company and against Butterfield Ford, the
company that sold the van to Mr. Sanns's employer, the State of Utah, alleging claims for
strict liability, breach of warranty and negligence. (R. 1-7.)
Butterfield Ford moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it was a "purely
passive distributor" of the allegedly defective product and that therefore no fault could be
assessed against it under the Utah Liability Reform Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37
through -43. (R. 30.) It supported its motion with the Affidavit of Brent E. Butterfield,
the president of Butterfield Ford. (R. 43-45.)
The trial court initially denied Butterfield Ford's motion for summary judgment
without prejudice to allow Mr. Sanns to conduct discovery to test Butterfield Ford's claim
that it was a purely passive distributor but indicated that it would grant the motion if Mr.
Sanns could not controvert the allegations in Mr. Butterfield's affidavit. (R. 115, 12122.)
After Mr. Sanns deposed Mr. Butterfield, Butterfield Ford renewed its motion for
summary judgment. (R. 204.) Mr. Sanns opposed the motion on two grounds. First, Mr.
3

Sanns claimed that there was evidence from which a jury could conclude that Butterfield
Ford was negligent. (R. 215-16.) Second, Mr. Sanns claimed that a passive retailer can
be strictly liable under Utah law and thus at "fault" within the meaning of the Liability
Reform Act, regardless of negligence. (R. 216-21.)
On June 2, 2003, the trial court entered an order granting Butterfield Ford's
renewed motion for summary judgment. (R. 326.) (A copy of the trial court's order is
included in the addendum.) The trial court held, among other things, that the plaintiff had
failed to present any credible evidence that Butterfield Ford was anything but a passive
distributor of the van. (R. 327, ^ 1.) The court further held:
The Utah Liability Reform Act. . . does not provide a cause of
action for strict liability against a purely passive distributor where the fault
complained of arises out of a design or manufacturing defect, and where the
manufacturer/designer of the product is a named party to the action. Under
these circumstances no fault can be apportioned] to the passive distributor
since it was not involved in the design and manufacture of the product. . . .
(R. 327, ^ 3.) The trial court certified its judgment as to Butterfield Ford as final under
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) (R. 327-28), and Mr. Sanns appealed that ruling (R.
312-13).

B.

Statement of Facts
The plaintiff, Barry Sanns, was a guard for the State of Utah Department of

Corrections. On December 7, 2000, he was helping to transport prisoners in a fifteen4

passenger Ford Econoline E350 van when the van rolled over several times, seriously
injuring Mr. Sanns and other occupants. (See R. 3; 335, at 3-4.)
The van was designed and manufactured by defendant Ford Motor Company
("Ford")- It was then delivered to defendant Butterfield Ford, the appellee, which sold
the van to the State of Utah, Mr. Sanns's employer. (See R. 33.)
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Butterfield Ford submitted an
affidavit from its president, Brent Butterfield, claiming that Butterfield Ford did not
participate in the design, manufacture, engineering, testing or assembly of the van and did
not prepare any warnings, labeling or instructions associated with the van. (R. 43-45.)
Mr. Sanns opposed Butterfield Ford's initial motion in part on the grounds that he
needed further discovery of Butterfield Ford. (See R. 68-71, 75-77.) The court denied
the motion to allow Mr. Sanns further discovery. (R. 121-22.) After Mr. Butterfield was
deposed, Butterfield Ford renewed its motion for summary judgment. In opposition to
Butterfield Ford's renewed motion, Mr. Sanns submitted evidence that Ford Econoline
vans have a high roof and a higher center of gravity than other passenger cars and thus
handle differently than other vehicles. (R. 232-33, 236, 238.) According to the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), these factors make a fully loaded
fifteen-passenger van such as the Econoline E350 harder to handle, and the decrease in
stability increases the rollover risk by about 40 percent. (See R. 258.) Fifteen-passenger
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vans with ten or more occupants are three times more likely to roll over than those with
fewer than ten occupants. (R. 257.) Such vans are involved in a higher number of singlevehicle accidents involving rollovers than are other passenger vehicles. (R. 259.) Eightyone percent of fatalities that occur in fifteen-passenger vans occur in single-vehicle
rollover accidents like the accident in this case. (R. 260.) From 1990 to 2001, 647 people
were killed in Econoline rollovers. (See R. 264.) There have been more than seventy
lawsuits involving Ford E350 vans. (R. 266.) Ford's own tests showed the E350 van was
''unsafe in handling and stability." (See R. 268.)
Butterfield Ford has been selling Ford Econoline vans since the 1960s. (R. 231.)
Brent Butterfield has been involved in the automotive industry since about the
1940s. (R. 227-28.) He has been an owner of Butterfield Ford since 1982. (R. 228-30.)
Mr. Butterfield served on an advisory council with Ford for two years, 2000 and 2001.
The council discussed some NHTSA inquiries. (R. 241.)
Butterfield Ford recognizes an obligation on its part to caution customers about
safety problems with the vehicles they buy (see R. 244-45), and in fact undertakes to
instruct some purchasers about problems with the vehicles it sells (R. 233). According to
Mr. Butterfield, if there is a safety problem with the vehicles Butterfield Ford sells, "we
are responsible, as is the factory . . . , and we would advise according to whatever
guidelines are set by whomever is in charge . . . ." (R. 245.)

6

Mr. Butterfield was aware that the Ford Econoline E350 van has a high roof and a
higher center of gravity than other passenger vehicles and thus handles differently. (R.
232-33, 236, 238, 243.)
Mr. Butterfield assumed that Butterfield Ford's sales managers know about the
stability of the Econoline E350 van as compared to the stability of passenger-type
vehicles. (R. 237.) He could not recall "specific training information or caution" about
the handling characteristics of Econoline vans until the 1990s, but testified that there is
now on the visor of the vehicle "a caution about what it is and that it should be driven
appropriately," and there is a similar "reminder" in the owner's manual. (R. 232.) Mr.
Butterfield could not say, however, whether Butterfield Ford employees specifically point
out these cautions to purchasers. (R. 238.) In fact, when asked if Butterfield Ford's
employees point out the visor warning on Econoline E350 vans when a retail purchaser is
picking up the van, Mr. Butterfield responded, "Boy, the only straight answer to that has
got to be probably some yes and probably some no." (R. 239.)
Mr. Butterfield testified that Butterfield Ford advises retail customers that the
Econoline E350 van handles differently than another type of vehicle, but it does not
necessarily advise fleet buyers such as the State of Utah, the buyer of the van in this case.
(R. 233-34, 243.)

7

When Ford had a problem with Firestone tires, Butterfield Ford retrieved
information about the problem from the Internet. (R. 241.) However, Mr. Butterfield
generally does not seek out information available in the press about Ford vehicles. (R.
246.) Nevertheless, Mr. Butterfield was aware of a press flurry in the late 1990s
regarding rollovers in Ford sport utility vehicles. (R. 242.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The evidence showed that Butterfield Ford was aware of handling problems with
the Ford Econoline E350 van and chose to warn some purchasers about the problems but
not others. There was thus a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Butterfield Ford
was negligent in selling the fifteen-passenger van at issue in this case to Mr. Sanns's
employer, the State of Utah, without adequately warning of the van's propensity to roll
over when loaded. (Point I.)
But even if Butterfield Ford was not negligent in its sale of the van, it can still be
liable to Mr. Sanns for his injuries under the Utah Liability Reform Act and the doctrine
of strict products liability. (Point II.)

8

ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING BUTTERFIELD FORD
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MR. SANNS'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIM.
Butterfield Ford claimed below that it could not be liable to Mr. Sanns because it
was not involved in the design, manufacture, assembly, testing, inspection or repair of the
van that rolled over and injured Mr. Sanns and did not know of the alleged product defect
(the van's propensity to roll over when loaded with ten or more occupants). The trial
court agreed and held that Mr. Sanns had "failed to present any credible evidence to show
that Butterfield Ford was anything but a passive distributor of the vehicle in question."
(R. 327,1fl.)
The evidence before the trial court showed that Butterfield Ford acknowledged
that it has a responsibility to advise its customers of safety problems with the vehicles it
sells. (R. 244-45.) It also showed that Butterfield Ford was aware that Ford Econoline
E350 vans handle differently from other vehicles because of their height and higher
center of gravity. (R. 232-33, 236, 238, 243.) These and other characteristics make the
vans more difficult to handle and more susceptible to rollovers. (See R. 258.)
According to the trial court, however:
The fact that Butterfield Ford acknowledged a van has a higher
center of gravity than a sports car and, as such, handles differently, does not
create a genuine issue of material fact that the dealer knew or should have
9

known of any alleged design defects. It simply means that vans ride higher
on the road than sports cars. The Court is not persuaded that this fact
changes the status of Butterfield Ford to something other than a passive
distributor.
(R. 327,1f 2.)
The evidence, however, showed that fifteen-passenger vans such as the Econoline
E350 do not "simply . . . ride higher on the road than sports cars" but that they are much
more susceptible to rollovers than other vehicles, particularly when loaded with ten or
more occupants. (See R. 257-60, 264, 268.) The danger presented by such vans
prompted the National Transportation Safety Board to issue a safety recommendation for
fifteen-passenger vans. (See R. 259.)
Moreover, the evidence showed that Butterfield Ford undertook to warn some
purchasers of the vans about the vans' handling problems and greater susceptibility to
rollovers but did not tell other purchasers, in particular, fleet buyers such as the State of
Utah, the purchaser of the van that injured Mr. Sanns. (R. 233-34, 239, 243.)
If Butterfield Ford was not fully aware of the safety problems with the E350 vans
it sold, it was only because it chose not to become informed. It did not seek out
information about stability problems with the vans it sold, nor did it try to pass such
information on to consumers. (See R. 246.)
A reasonable jury could conclude from this evidence that Butterfield Ford knew or
should have known that the Econoline E350 vans it sold were unreasonably dangerous
10

and much more likely to roll over than other passenger vehicles and that Butterfield Ford
failed to exercise reasonable care to make sure that users of the vans were aware of the
problems with the vans. On Butterfield Ford's motion for summary judgment, the trial
court was required to view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and draw
all reasonable inferences in his favor. E.g., Frisbee v. K&K Constr. Co., 676 P.2d 387,
389 (Utah 1984); Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). Viewed in this
light, the evidence presented a jury question on Mr. Sanns's negligence claim against
Butterfield Ford, and the trial court erred in granting Butterfield Ford's renewed motion
for summary judgment on that claim.

II.
THE TRIAL COURT ALSO ERRED IN GRANTING BUTTERFIELD FORD
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MR. SANNS'S CLAIM FOR
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY.
Even if Butterfield Ford were not negligent as a matter of law, it could still be
liable to Mr. Sanns in strict products liability. See Siisze v. Stanley-Bostitch, 1999 UT 20,
f 8, 979 P.2d 317 (it is possible to bring both a negligence and a strict liability claim
against the same defendant). The trial court, however, held:
The Utah Liability Reform A c t . . . does not provide a cause of
action for strict liability against a purely passive distributor where the fault
complained of arises out of a design or manufacturing defect, and where the
manufacturer/designer of the product is a named party to the action. Under
11

these circumstances no fault can be apportioned] to the passive distributor
since it was not involved in the design and manufacture of the product... .
(R. 327, H 3.)
For the reasons stated in point I, supra, the trial court erred in concluding that
Butterfield Ford was a "purely passive distributor" of a defective product. There was a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Butterfield Ford was negligent in selling the
van without adequate warnings regarding its handling and stability problems. The trial
court also erred, however, in ruling that a "purely passive distributor" of a defective
product cannot be liable under the Utah Liability Reform Act and that Butterfield Ford
was therefore entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on Mr. Sanns's strict products
liability claim.
The Liability Reform Act specifically contemplates a cause of action for strict
products liability against the seller of a defective product, regardless of whether the seller
is otherwise at "fault." The act provides: "A person seeking recovery [here, Mr. Sanns]
may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose fault. . . exceeds the fault
of the person seeking recovery

" UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-38(2) (2002). Thus, if

Butterfield Field is considered at "fault" and its fault, together with that of Ford, exceeds
that of Mr. Sanns, Mr. Sanns may recover from Butterfield Ford, and Butterfield Ford can
be liable to Mr. Sanns.
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"Fault" within the meaning of the Liability Reform Act is broader than the
traditional concept of "fault." The act defines "fault" as "any actionable breach of legal
duty, act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained
by a person seeking recovery, including negligence in all its degrees,... strict liability,
breach of express or implied warranty of a product, [and] products liability . . . . " Id. §
78-27-37(2) (emphasis added). The plaintiffs claims against Butterfield Ford sound not
only in negligence but also in strict products liability. Both are encompassed within the
Liability Reform Act's definition of "fault." The Liability Reform Act does not make any
exceptions for "purely passive distributors" or non-manufacturing sellers like Butterfield
Ford.
The Liability Reform Act does not define "strict liability" or "products liability"
but leaves the definition of those terms to other law. Similarly, the Utah Product Liability
Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§78-15-1 through -7, does not define "products liability" or
"strict liability" but presupposes that a claim for strict products liability exists under Utah
law.1 Significantly, the Product Liability Act does not immunize so-called passive
distributors from liability but recognizes that a products liability claim may be brought
1

The act establishes a statute of limitations for product liability claims,
prohibits pleading a specific dollar amount of damages in the complaint, defines "fault"
within the meaning of the Liability Reform Act to include alteration or modification of a
product under certain conditions, and creates a rebuttable presumption that a product that
conforms to government standards is free from defects. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-153, -4, -5 & -6.
13

against a "retailer," such as Butterfield Ford. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-4 (no dollar
amount can be specified in the prayer of a complaint filed "in a product liability action
against a product manufacturer, wholesaler or retailer").
Thus, to determine whether Mr. Sanns has a claim for strict products liability
against Butterfield Ford under Utah law, the court must look to the common law.
The Utah Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of strict products liability in Ernest
W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Company, 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979). It did so in the
language of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 601 P.2d at 158. Section
402A states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer . . . is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A (1963 & 1964). This rule, which makes "the

seller subject to liability to the user or consumer even though he has exercised all possible
14

care in the preparation and sale of the product, " id. cmt. a (emphasis added), was based
on the theory that, as between an innocent user of the product and the person who sold the
product, the one who should bear the loss is the one who created the danger by placing
the product on the market and who benefited from the sale of the product-that is, the
seller of the product, in this case, Butterfield Ford. See id. cmt. c; Ernest W. Hahn, Inc.,
601 P.2d at 156-57 (citations omitted); Hanover v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 758 P.2d 443,
445 (Utah Ct App. 1988) (citation omitted). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A, cmt./('The basis for the rule is the ancient one of the special responsibility for
the safety of the public undertaken by one who enters into the business of supplying
human beings with products which may endanger the safety of their persons and property,
and the forced reliance upon that undertaking on the part of those who purchase such
goods").
The rule stated in section 402A "applies to any person engaged in the business of
selling products for use or consumption," including "any wholesale or retail dealer or
distributor." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt./ 2
2

The same rule applies under the new Restatement on products liability:
"One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or
distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property
caused by the defect." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1
(1997). The comments to the new Restatement also make it clear that the rule covers
retailers such as Butterfield Ford:
The rule stated in this Section provides that all commercial sellers and
15

The Utah Supreme Court has never overruled Hahn, nor has it abandoned the
doctrine of strict products liability as stated in section 402A. See, e.g., Slisze v. StanleyBostitch, 1999 UT 20, f 8, 979 P.2d 318 (it is possible to simultaneously bring a
negligence and a strict liability claim). Indeed, Utah appellate courts have continued to
recognize that non-manufacturing sellers of products are potentially liable for claims
sounding in products liability, even after enactment of the Liability Reform Act. See,
e.g., House v. Armour of Am., Inc., 886 P.2d 542, 555 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (reversing a
summary judgment in favor of a non-manufacturing distributor of a bulletproof vest),
affd, 929 P.2d 340 (Utah 1996). See also Jackson v. Philip Morris Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d
1217, 1229 (D. Utah 1998) ("under Utah strict products liability law, a plaintiff may sue
the distributor of an unreasonably dangerous product so long as the distributor is
sufficiently placed within the chain of distribution of the product from the manufacturer
to the ultimate consumer").
For purposes of its renewed motion for summary judgment, Butterfield Ford did
not dispute that it was engaged in the business of selling Ford Econoline vans (see R. 44,
distributors of products, including nonmanufacturing sellers and
distributors such as wholesalers and retailers, are subject to liability for
selling products that are defective. Liability attaches even when such
nonmanufacturing sellers or distributors do not themselves render the
products defective and regardless of whether they are in a position to
prevent defects from occurring.
Id. cmt. e (emphasis added).
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Tf 4; 231); that Ford Econoline vans such as the van at issue in this case were in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user; or that the changes the State of
Utah made in the van in order to use it to transport prisoners did not affect the van's
stability. Therefore, Mr. Sanns stated a claim against Butterfield Ford for strict products
liability under section 402A, and Butterfield Ford could be liable for Mr. Sanns's injuries
even if it had "exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of [its] product."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A(2)(a). The trial court erred in ruling that

Butterfield Ford could not be liable to Mr. Sanns as a matter of law.
Butterfield Ford argued below—and the trial court agreed—that it could not be
liable to Mr. Sanns under the Liability Reform Act because it was not at "fault" because it
did not design or manufacture the defective van. (See R. 327, f 3.) But "fault" under the
Liability Reform Act is broader than traditional notions of fault. It includes strict liability
and products liability. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37(2). The seller of a defective
product can be liable in strict products liability even if the seller's only "fault" was
placing a defective product into the stream of commerce. See, e.g., Marcon v. Kmart
Corp., 573 N.W.2d 728, 730-31 (Minn. Ct. App.), review denied (Minn. 1998) (strict
liability could be imposed on a nonmanufacturing seller of a product that was defective
due to a failure to warn even if the seller was not negligent). Ford, the designer and
manufacturer of the van, may have been more at fault than Butterfield Ford, the retailer,
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but that does not mean that Butterfield Ford was not also at fault. Ford's fault in
designing and manufacturing a defective product does not excuse Butterfield Ford's fault
in selling a defective product.
Butterfield Ford suggested below that its fault is zero compared to Ford's. (See,
e.g., R. 335, at 12.) Comparative fault is a question for the jury to decide. Steffensen v.
Smith's Management Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1348 (Utah 1993) (the apportionment of
negligence is exclusively the jury's responsibility); Little Am. Refining Co. v. Leyba, 641
P.2d 112, 114 (Utah 1982) (apportionment of fault is a fact question entrusted to the jury).
This court need not decide at this time how fault should be apportioned between an
allegedly negligent manufacturer and a so-called passive retailer or distributor. It is
enough to hold that Butterfield Ford has at least some "fault" under Utah law by virtue of
having sold a defective product.
Nevertheless, other authorities that have considered the issue have concluded that
the liability of a passive retailer in a case like this is a form of vicarious liability and that
the retailer and manufacturer should therefore be treated as a single unit for
apportionment of fault; to the extent the retailer is held liable for the harm caused by the
defective product, it may have a claim for indemnity against the manufacturer. See, e.g.,
Arena v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 590, 593-94 (Cal. Ct.
App.), review denied (Cal. 1998); Wimberlyv. Derby Cycle Corp., 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 532,
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536-41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Owens v. Truckstops of Am., 915 S.W.2d 420, 432-33

(Term. 1996); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY

§ 7 cmt.

j ; § 13 & cmts. a & d (1999). See also Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 758 P.2d
443, 447 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (an innocent or passive retailer who is claimed to be
strictly liable for the plaintiffs injuries may be entitled to indemnity from the negligent
manufacturer) (decided under the law as it existed before passage of the Liability Reform
Act). Cf Owens, 915 S.W.2d at 434 ("there can be no claim for indemnification based on
active-passive negligence because that distinction is subsumed into the doctrine of
comparative fault"; however, "where implied indemnity is based on the legal relationship
between the parties, the traditional principles of indemnity continue to apply"). See
generally Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Products Liability: Seller's Right to Indemnity
from Manufacturer, 79 A.L.R. 4TH 278 (1990).
Strict products liability is a joint tort in the original sense of the word. All the
defendants in the stream of commerce act in concert to see that the product reaches the
ultimate user or consumer. Under traditional principles of tort law, joint tortfeasors (i.e.,
those liable for a joint tort) could all be liable for all of the plaintiffs injuries, under the
theory that the act of one was the act of all. See American Motorcycle Ass 'n v. Superior
Court, 578 P.2d 899, 904 (Cal. 1978); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 46, at 291 (4th ed. 1971).
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This approach makes sense, since, in the case of strict products liability, the "fault"
is really with the product, and all those in the chain of distribution are equally at fault for
placing a defective product in the stream of commerce. See Owens, 915 S.W.2d at 433.
Cf. Arena, 1A Cal. Rptr. 2d at 593 ("we focus on the instrumentality causing the harm
rather than solely on the status of the defendant").
But the court need not decide this issue at this time. The issue will not be ripe
until a jury holds Butterfield Ford liable for all or part of Mr. Sanns's claims. The only
issue this court need decide is whether the Liability Reform Act did away with a claim of
strict products liability against a retailer such as Butterfield Ford. By the plain terms of
the act, it did not, and the trial court erred in ruling otherwise. The court should remand
this case so that a jury may consider Mr. Sanns's strict liability claim against Butterfield
Ford.

CONCLUSION
In granting summary judgment to Butterfield Ford, the trial court erroneously ruled
that Butterfield Ford could not be liable to Mr. Sanns because, under the Liability Reform
Act, no fault can be assessed against a purely passive distributor.
For the reasons stated in point I, supra, the trial court erred in concluding that
Butterfield Ford was a "purely passive" distributor; Butterfield Ford was at least negligent
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in putting into the stream of commerce a product it knew or should have known was
highly susceptible to rollover accidents and in failing to adequately warn users of the van
of its handling and stability problems.
But even if Butterfield Ford were simply a "passive distributor" of the van, it can
still be liable to Mr. Sanns for strict products liability. As explained in point II, supra, the
Liability Reform Act did not do away with the strict liability of non-manufacturing
distributers of products under Utah law. Mr. Butterfield himself recognized as much
when he testified that, if there is a safety problem with the vehicles Butterfield Ford sells,
'Sve are responsible, as is the factory . . .." (R. 245.)
The application of the Liability Reform Act in this case may raise other issues,
such as how the fault of a manufacturer and retailer are to be compared and whether a
retailer who is required to pay damages to an injured party has a claim for indemnity
against the manufacturer, but this court does not have to reach those issues at this time. It
is enough to hold that Butterfield Ford's conduct in placing a defective product into the
stream of commerce falls squarely within the Liability Reform Act's definition of "fault"
and that Butterfield Ford can therefore be liable to Mr. Sanns in strict products liability.
The court should therefore reverse the trial court's ruling granting summary
judgment to Butterfield Ford and remand this case for further proceedings against
Butterfield Ford.
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DATED this 2nd day of October, 2003.
DEWSNUP, KING & OLSEN

David R. Olsen
Paul M. Simmons
Timothy J. Ryan
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ADDENDUM
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment.

(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall
be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37. Definitions.
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43:
(1) "Defendant" means a person, other than a person immune from suit as defined
in Subsection (3), who is claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking
recovery.
(2) "Fault"' means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission
proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a person seeking
recovery, including negligence in all its degrees, comparative negligence, assumption of
risk, strict liability, breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products liability,
and misuse, modification, or abuse of a product.
(3) "Person immune from suit" means:
(a) an employer immune from suit under Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers'
Compensation Act, or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act; and
(b) a governmental entity or governmental employee immune from suit
pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 30, Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
(4) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or
reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom it is authorized to act
as legal representative.
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38. Comparative negligence.
(1) The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery by that
person.
(2) A person seeking recovery may recover from any defendant or group of
defendants whose fault, combined with the fault of persons immune from suit, exceeds
the fault of the person seeking recovery prior to any reallocation of fault made under
Subsection 78-27-39(2).
(3) No defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount in excess
of the proportion of fault attributed to that defendant under Section 78-27-39.
(4) (a) In determining the proportionate fault attributable to each defendant, the
fact finder may, and when requested by a party shall, consider the conduct of any
person who contributed to the alleged injury regardless of whether the person is a
person immune from suit or a defendant in the action and may allocate fault to
each person seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to any other person whether
joined as a party to the action or not and whose identity is known or unknown to
the parties to the action, including a person immune from suit who contributed to
the alleged injury. In the case of a motor vehicle accident involving an
unidentified motor vehicle, the existence of the vehicle shall be proven by clear
and convincing evidence which may consist solely of one person's testimony.
(b) Any fault allocated to a person immune from suit is considered only to
accurately determine the fault of the person seeking recovery and a defendant and
may not subject the person immune from suit to any liability, based on the
allocation of fault, in this or any other action.
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athJJY CLERK

Attorneys for Defendants Ford Motor Company and
Butterfield Ford

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
BARRY SANNS,
Plaintiff,
v.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware
Corporation; BUTTERFIELD FORD, a
Utah Corporation; and DOES 1 THROUGH
30,

ORDER GRANTING BUTTERFIELD
FORD'S RENEWED MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 020904820
Judge Stephen L. Henriod

Defendants.

Defendant Butterfield Ford's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment ("Renewed
Motion") came before this Court for oral argument on May 20, 2003. The Honorable Stephen L.
Henriod presided. Plaintiff was represented by David R. Olsen and Paul M. Simmons. Defendant
Butterfield Ford was represented by Bryon J. Benevento and Brian C. Cheney. The Court noted
that it had previously granted Plaintiff additional time to conduct discovery in order to oppose
Defendant Butterfield Ford's initial Motion for Summary Judgment that was filed on December
13, 2002. After reviewing the Renewed Motion, the opposing and supporting memoranda, the
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Affidavit of Brent Butterfield, the deposition testimony and other documentary exhibits, and
having heard oral argument of counsel, the Court finds as follows:
Findings
1.

Plaintiff failed to present any credible evidence to show that Butterfield Ford was

anything but a passive distributor of the vehicle in question. Butterfield Ford did not design,
manufacture, test, assemble, package or ship the vehicle. It did not modify, alter or change the
vehicle in any manner. Instead, it simply sold the vehicle to the State of Utah as part of a fleet
transaction in the same condition as the vehicle was received from Ford Motor Company.
2.

The fact that Butterfield Ford acknowledged a van has a higher center of gravity

than a sports car and, as such, handles differently, does not create a genuine issue of material fact
that the dealer knew or should have known of any alleged design defects. It simply means that
vans ride higher on the road than sports cars. The Court is not persuaded that this fact changes the
status of Butterfield Ford to something other than a passive distributor of the vehicle.
3.

The Utah Liability Reform Act ("Act") does not provide a cause of action for strict

liability against a purely passive distributor where the fault complained of arises out of a design or
manufacturing defect, and where the manufacturer/designer of the product is a named party to the
action. Under these circumstances no fault can be apportion to the passive distributor since it was
not involved in the design and manufacture of the product. To hold otherwise would render the
apportionment of fault a legal fiction since fault presupposes some breach of duty or culpable act
of commission or omission that cannot exist in a case of a purely passive distributor. It would also
reinstate the concept of joint and several liability which has been expressly abrogated by the Act.
Order
Based upon the forgoing, it is hereby ordered that Defendant Butterfield Ford's Renewed
Motion is granted, and Plaintiffs claims against Butterfield Ford are dismissed with prejudice.
The Court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay and therefore directs
that this order be entered as a final judgment as to defendant Butterfield Ford under Utah Rule of
254147 1
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Civil Procedure 54(b).
DATED this _ > _ day of June, 2003.
By the Court

Judge Stephen L^Peikj6d
Third Judicial District'Court Judge
**•«.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

David R. Olsen
Paul M. Simmons
Dewsnup, King & pisen
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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